"One thing is sure, a great change of our psychological attitude is imminent. That is certain." And why? "Because we need more -- we need more psychology. We need more understanding of human nature, because the only real danger that exists is man himself. He is the great danger, and we are pitifully unaware of it. We know nothing of man, far too little. His psyche should be studied, because we are the origin of all coming evil." Carl Jung 1959, BBC's Face to Face TV series aired a 40-minute interview with Carl Jung at the old age of 84 years old--18 months before his death.
"Today the most important thing, in my view, is to study the reasons why humankind does nothing to avert the threats about which it knows so much, and why it allows itself to be carried onward by some kind of perpetual motion. It cannot suffice to invent new machines, new regulations, new institutions. It is necessary to change and improve our understanding of the true purpose of what we are and what we do in the world. Only such an understanding will allow us to develop new models of behavior, new scales of values and goals, and thereby invest the global regulations, treaties, and institutions with a new spirit and meaning." President Vaclav Havel, Czech Republic. September, 1997?
"It is not famine, not earthquakes, not microbes, not cancer but man himself who is man's greatest danger to man, for the simple reason that there is no adequate protection against psychic epidemics, which are infinitely more devastating than the worst of natural catastrophes" - Carl Jung
United we stand a chance against the coming chaos. Divided we are greatly endangered.
Below is a Wpost opinion piece...and my longer personal story linked to weaponized smallpox that John Bolton did not mention in his excellent take on what may be humanities greatest - and most immediate threat... now accelerated by AI.
Oct 14
(Wednesday), 2026 Washington Post
Opinion page.
“John Bolton:
How the U.S. should respond to Russia’s plague incident
Even if initial
worries prove unfounded, history shows Moscow cannot be trusted regarding
biowarfare.” (a 6-minute read)
By John R. Bolton (Former ambassador to the
United Nations under President George W. Bush and national security adviser
under President Donald Trump.)
The recent death of Darya Shipilova, a 28-year-old
Russian laboratory technician, of pneumonic plague raised worldwide concerns
because of her workplace: the Irkutsk Antiplague Institute of Siberia. With the
covid pandemic in mind, the public focused on whether another such crisis could
be upon the world. Moscow asserts there is no cause for alarm. But Russia’s
record for veracity is hardly encouraging.
Despite having only information provided by Russian
officials, U.S. Centers for Disease Control Director Erica Schwartz said last
week that the “threat to the United States is extremely low.” President Donald
Trump downplayed the possibility that the episode might be linked to biowarfare
research, saying, “We’re going to find out soon enough, but we don’t think so.”
Taking a more cautious approach to Moscow’s assurances
would be advisable, especially in light of important lessons from the Wuhan
Institute of Virology and its possible connection to Chinese bioweapons
research. Even purely epidemiological research can provide findings highly
relevant to sophisticated bioweapons capabilities. Notably, the Trump administration’s
2026 intelligence-community threat assessment states expressly that “Russia’s
scientists continue developing new CBW” — chemical-biological-warfare —
“capabilities,” and that “China probably possesses CBW capabilities that
threaten U.S., allied, and partner forces as well as civilian populations.”
Worries about another pandemic are warranted, but so,
too, are worries about Russian and Chinese threats to U.S. national security.
Even if initial apprehensions prove unfounded, the Irkutsk incident should be
treated as a red flag, not a false alarm. There is a long history that should
not be ignored.
Kanatjan Alibekov, from 1988 until his 1992 defection
from Russia, was a top official at Biopreparat whose “primary function was to
develop and produce weapons made from the most dangerous viruses, toxins and
bacteria known to man.” His 1999 memoir, “Biohazard” (published under his
Americanized name, Ken Alibek, with Stephen Handelman), remains basic reading
for understanding Russian biowarfare research.
Journalist Judith Miller and her co-authors advanced
the story in 2001 with “Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War.”
They demonstrate, for example, how much Washington learned after the Soviet
Union’s collapse, such as at “the premier Soviet germ factory” at Stepnogorsk,
in newly independent Kazakhstan, with its facilities and scientists fully
available to the West.
Moscow expended considerable time and effort to
recover from losing so many resources and talents, but recover it did, as the
U.S. intelligence community confirms. Of course, not every Russian biology lab
engages in weapons-related activity. Nonetheless, governments with illicit
weapons-of-mass-destruction programs — nuclear and chemical as well as
biological — routinely conduct activities in plain sight that can have both a
legitimate civilian application and a military one. As more-sophisticated research
becomes increasingly sensitive, and “dual use” explanations less plausible if
not impossible, more precautions are taken. Actual weaponization work is as
fully concealed as possible.
Interestingly, the Irkutsk antiplague facility’s
website says it also studies brucellosis, anthrax and tularemia, all of which
have been researched over decades for potential biowarfare use. The institute
also acknowledges its work in biodefense research, particularly against
bioterrorism. This “defensive” activity may be entirely legitimate under the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention, to which both Russia and China subscribe,
just as the United States and many other nations do.
The problem is that, scientifically, purely defensive
research is hard to distinguish from offensive research, and defensive research
can readily advance more threatening work elsewhere. For countries that take
treaty obligations seriously, this is not an issue. Rogue states, however, sign
arms-control agreements and then violate them at will, using “defensive
research” as a dodge. Indeed, one reason President George W. Bush’s
administration rejected a draft verification protocol to the Biological Weapons
Convention is that biological programs are inherently unverifiable. As the
saying, sometimes apocryphally attributed to Winston Churchill, goes, the only
countries that comply with arms-control agreements are countries you don’t need
arms-control agreements with.
Today’s fear of the expanding weapons spectrum, from
drone technology to artificial intelligence’s perhaps existential threat,
should not distract us from the hard reality of already-existing threats.
Moscow’s gray-zone warfare in Europe — exemplified in August by a failed attack
on Germany’s Leipzig airport using an explosives-laden drone, which German
officials blamed on Russia — should be another red flag. It has long been known
that properly prepared, aerosolized biowarfare agents can be spread by innocent-appearing
crop-duster airplanes, or, now, by drones.
Merely demanding more “transparency” from Russia, as the World Health Organization is doing, is far from sufficient. We simply do not have, and probably will not have, enough information to draw firm conclusions. We do know enough that the Irkutsk incident should not be left unexamined, even if the current White House is extraordinarily considerate of Vladimir Putin’s wishes.
Instead, the relevant congressional committees should conduct systematic reviews of both the global bioweapons threat to America and the adequacy of U.S. defenses. That review should include the national-security implications of U.S. taxpayer funds being granted to foreign research institutions, to avoid subsidizing America’s enemies. Time is short.
(135 comments so far. None mentioned weaponized smallpox)
Biological
Weapons, Global Interdependence and Our Deficit of Wisdom: By a former issues director for the
Global Health Council (originally National Council for International Health)
then the World Federal Association for 4 more years.
I have been raising these concerns for decades. In 1996 and 1997, I gave congressional testimony about the threats posed by the inevitability of biological weapons and the inadequacy of our responses. As issues director for two national organizations focused on human and national security, and elected as member of the American Public Health Association’s Action Board, I saw the dangers of treating global health threats as secondary to conventional national security concerns even by US intelligence agencies.
Even their warnings were largely ignored. And still are.
Smallpox
provided a valuable lesson. Before
Ken Alibek published his 1999 memoir, Biohazard, I interviewed him
face-to-face in Virginia. Alibek, formerly the second-in-command of the Soviet
Union’s Biopreparat biological weapons program, described work that should have
permanently changed how we think about national security and US foreign policy.
The danger went
beyond a government deliberately launching a biological attack. It was how a
pathogen, research capability, and basic knowledge to weaponize a pathogen -
might escape the systems intended to contain it. Accidents and wars happen.
The Iraqi warning signs came from the first Gulf War in 1991. It provided a disturbing example after the conflict following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. U.S. intelligence reported that eight of 69 Iraqi prisoners of war whose blood was tested showed immunity to smallpox, a disease that had not circulated naturally in Iraq for decades. Other reporting raised questions about Iraq’s biological weapons ambitions and its interest in smallpox and even camelpox.
Larger questions remained: What if a regime facing military defeat decided to
use a biological weapon? Or, its release
unintentionally during the chaos of war?
The lesson goes
beyond the transfer of scientific knowledge being dangerous. First, the
distinction between defensive and offensive applications is less certain than what
policymakers intend for us to believe.
Second is the inevitable limits of bio and
cyber security. Bolton is right
emphasizing the difficulty of determining the origins and purposes of
biological research. A laboratory ‘gain of function’ research of a dangerous
pathogen may be trying to prevent an epidemic, develop treatments or improve
vaccines. Much of the same underlying knowledge can also be misused.
Third, the most
sophisticated intelligence services cannot guarantee that every dangerous
program will be discovered, every stockpile accounted for, or every scientist
and institution acting responsibly. Nor
can border controls and military deterrence guarantee protection against every
naturally occurring outbreak, laboratory accident, or deliberate release.
Cybersecurity
faces related problems. Software vulnerabilities evolve, attackers adapt, and
defensive systems cannot guarantee that every intrusion will be prevented.
Biological and cyber threats are not identical, but both demonstrate the limits
of trying to secure complex, interconnected systems through defensive measures
alone.
In this sense,
bio and cyber security are oxymorons.
And sustainable security is a delusion.
Nations depending on strong defenses, effective intelligence,
international verification, responsible research standards, and emergency
preparedness are going broke in this reactionary mode. Preemptive or offensive
efforts will only perpetuate this dilemma or make things worse.
Preventing, or
at least reducing conditions that encourage people and governments to turn
their capabilities against others is an economic and security necessity.
We must
transform ‘peace through strength’ into ‘security through cooperation’. Since the invention of nuclear weapons,
our foreign policies should have placed far greater emphasis on making close
and caring friends. And far fewer vengeful
enemies. Yet, national sovereignty and
the delusion of independence remains our dominant global organizing principle
of international affairs. Governments understandably seek to protect their
populations. But the pursuit of security
through competition instead of kindness, compassion, and cooperation is necessary
to protect everyone and our life support systems .
Viruses don’t
recognize national borders. Neither do many of the consequences of
cyberattacks, environmental degradation, economic instability, terrorist
attacks, or war. A pathogen released in one country can become a threat to the
entire world. A cyberattack on critical infrastructure can disrupt systems far
beyond its original target. Environmental damage in one region can undermine
food security and public health elsewhere.
Our
independence is therefore limited by our irreversible interdependence. We may
declare sovereignty, build walls, stockpile weapons and prepare for
adversaries, but none of these measures can make us independent of the health
and stability of the wider human family and our any civilized social species
sustainability.
And in our era
where almost anything can be and has been weaponized - disarmament is not an
option. Even if governments eliminated existing weapons, dangerous knowledge
would remain, and new technologies could create new ways to cause unprecedented
harm. The challenge is not to eliminate weapon, but to develop the
institutions, relationships, and shared commitments that make their creation
and use far less likely.
After World
War II the nations involved agreed there should not be another world war,
genocide, or use of WMD. But those in
power decided to protect national sovereignty (independence) instead of
ensuring the protection of 30 universal human rights that most nations did
agree on. Nations now in power are unlikely to ever
enforce those rights. But we have the UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals that could
be our best global security strategy. These offer a framework for systemically,
comprehensively, holistically, and synergistically addressing our growing interconnected
threats. They encompass health, education, food security, poverty, inequality,
environmental sustainability, effective institutions and international
cooperation.
These goals are
often discussed as a development agenda, separate from national security. That
separation is a profound mistake. Strong
public health systems prevent or help detect outbreaks before they spread.
International cooperation makes it easier to quickly share vital information,
build trust and respond adequately to emergencies.
Effective transparent
institutions can reduce corruption and improve accountability. Education and
economic opportunities will help communities withstand instability and build
resilience. Environmental protection
reduces risks to the natural systems on which human health and food security
depend.
No single goal
can accomplish these things alone. The goals are interdependent, just as the
threats they are meant to address are interdependent. This is why I have long argued that
prevention deserves a much higher priority than crisis response. Humankind will
never eliminate every threat, but united we can reduce the vulnerabilities that
make disasters more likely and their consequences more severe.
The SDGs are
not a substitute for intelligence, laboratories, military readiness or
responsible oversight of biotechnology or AI. They are a framework for growing
and strengthening the social, institutional and environmental foundations on
which sustainable security and maximum prosperity depends.
Bolton
concludes with a warning “time is short”. I agree. But I would add that we have
a deficit of wisdom.
For decades, we’ve
known that the technologies capable of improving human life can also threaten
it. We’ve known that personal and national security cannot be separated from
global health. We’ve known that scientific knowledge crosses borders and that a
disaster anywhere can become a danger everywhere.
Yet we continue
to devote enormous resources to preparing for conflict while underinvesting in
preventing the conditions that produce it.
Our collective
choice is not between national defense and global cooperation. We need both. The choice is whether we
recognize that defense alone cannot yield lasting security in our
interdependent world. Thus, our highest
priority must be the health of people and nature: healthy minds, bodies,
families, communities, sustainable environments, and institutions capable of
working together across national boundaries.
That requires a
change in the way we define security. Instead of making national independence
our ultimate objective, we must acknowledge our shared dependence on a healthy
and stable world.
The biological
imperative is clear: Make more friends and far fewer enemies. Prevent what we
can. Cooperate where we must. And stop confusing the ability to retaliate
against a threat with the ability to prevent one.
We have the
scientific knowledge to understand these dangers. We must engineer an
international framework to begin addressing them. What we lack is the
collective political will to put human survival ahead of rivalries that
endanger all of us.
Time is
short. But our deficit of wisdom is our greatest threat.