Saturday, November 14, 2026

Endless Wars: A Superpower Suicide Pact

 Below is my draft letter to the editor of the WPost article summarized earlier. It's response to the 'conservative' analysis RE what has kept our nation (and the world) in an endless war against a tactic -- that can never be defeated.

Dear Editor, (this is long…but extremely important).

Endless Wars: A Suicide Pact for Superpowers

Response to Douglas J. Feith and Lewis Libby, "Endless wars is a catchy phrase, not a reason to shift policy," The Washington Post, November 10, 2026. (print edition 11-12-26)

Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby argue that "endless wars" is a catchy political slogan, but not a legitimate reason to change American foreign policy. They invoke Lincoln, Churchill, Eisenhower and Reagan to suggest that perseverance in prolonged conflicts can ultimately produce security.  It cannot!  Their historical comparisons overlook a fundamental difference: Those leaders confronted identifiable political and military objectives. The so-called ‘Global War Against Terrorism’ has no comparable endpoint. Terrorism is a tactic, not an enemy that can surrender. How can we declare victory over a tactic that can be used by virtually anyone, anywhere, indefinitely.  Especially with the evolution of weaponry…with almost anything being weaponized?

The most important voice missing from their argument is Osama bin Laden's.

Bin Laden studied the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and concluded that even a superpower could be weakened through prolonged conflict. In 2004, he explicitly described al-Qaeda's strategy: "bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy."

He also explained that al-Qaeda wanted to create a wedge between the American people and their government by emphasizing financial and human casualties. These were not retrospective interpretations of his intentions. They were his stated objectives, documented in a 2006 White House compilation of terrorist statements.   Consider the results.

Brown University's Costs of War Project estimates that America's post-September 11 wars have cost approximately $8 trillion. At least 940,000 people have died directly from war violence, with millions more dying indirectly. The estimated future costs of caring for post-9/11 veterans alone reach $2.2 trillion to $2.5 trillion through 2050.  The consequences will continue as started his costly war with Iran. An Associated Press report this fall described more than $37.5 billion in U.S. costs, 18 American service members killed, many injured, disrupted global energy supplies, and no clear path out.

Meanwhile, the Congressional Budget Office projects publicly held federal debt reaching 120 percent of GDP by 2036. Interest payments alone are projected to exceed $2 trillion annually by then.

The problem isn’t America’s lacking will to fight.  We repeatedly confuse the capacity to wage war with the ability to create lasting security. This isn’t exclusively an American problem.  Religious and political movements have repeatedly justified violence through claims of divine authority, historical entitlement, and territorial destiny. The Crusades, current religious nationalism with competing claims to sacred land.  These demonstrate the danger of treating religious texts as political or territorial mandates. No religious tradition has a monopoly on this problem, and no civilian population should be held responsible for its ruthless leaders.

All this is compounded by the continuing evolution of weaponry. Every competing military and political system develops new ways to overcome their adversaries’ capabilities. Nuclear, biological, autonomous weapons now using artificial intelligence are accelerating the lethality of competition. We’re building increasingly sophisticated means of destroying civilization without demonstrating comparable sophistication in preventing conflict.

Even without AI, humankind has the capacity to destroy itself. AI makes that danger considerably worse.

Feith and Libby say the right question is whether achievable objectives justify the costs and risks. I agree. But that standard must apply to every war, including those already underway. We must ask not simply whether we can continue fighting, but whether continued fighting makes us safer.

National security requires more than military strength. Functional strength is a rapid capacity to adapt.  This requires economic resilience, public health, education, functioning institutions, and most important-- international cooperation and prevention of the conditions generating violence.

The 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals offer a framework for addressing these interdependent sources of insecurity. Prevention is not surrender. Diplomacy is not weakness. And recognizing the limits of military power is not a lack of resolve.

Endless wars -can be a suicide pact for superpowers. We cannot bomb, borrow or technologically out-weapon our way to a healthy, secure and sustainable world.

cw

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Feith and Libby’s insane Essay on “Endless Wars” in Today's WashPost.

The next few blogpost (today - the first time I've done this) are in response to today's 'conservative' analysis in the Washington Post (print addition today) that has kept our nation (and the world) in an endless war against a tactic that can never be defeated. This endless war could collapse our nation by an unsustainable debt -- or the evolution of weaponry without the evolving of our national and global governing systems.  Flaws systems based on the delusion independence - that "We the people" have not used any of the three means of amending it - to move closer to our nation's founding document, the 1776 Declaration.   

Feith and Libby’s Washington Post Essay on “Endless Wars”

Douglas J. Feith and Lewis Libby’s November 10, 2026 Washington Post op‑ed argues that “endless wars” is a catchy slogan, not a valid reason to change U.S. policy, and urges leaders to focus on the worthiness of goals rather than the length of conflict The Washington Post+1.

Core Argument

Feith, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush, and Libby, a distinguished fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and former chief of staff and national security adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, contend that the phrase “endless wars” is appealing but misleading The Washington Post. They argue that the decisive factor in military decisions should be the worthiness of the objectives, not how long a war lasts Hudson.

Historical Examples

The authors illustrate their point with four historical cases:

  • Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War: Faced unprecedented losses and political pressure to end the war, but understood that surrendering would have entangled the U.S. in disunion and slavery The Washington Post.

  • Winston Churchill in 1940: Despite Britain’s isolation and uncertainty, vowed to fight for years if necessary, enabling eventual victory over Nazi Germany The Washington Post.

  • Dwight D. Eisenhower in Korea: Secured a truce after a long, inconclusive war, which helped South Korea develop into a democracy The Washington Post.

  • Ronald Reagan in the Cold War: Maintained a long‑term strategic stance to counter Soviet expansion, ultimately leading to its successful conclusion The Washington Post.

In each case, leaders avoided “endless” sacrifice only because they believed the goals were worth pursuing, not because they feared the duration of conflict Hudson.

Policy Implication

Feith and Libby warn that if adversaries see U.S. “fearful rhetoric” about endless war, they may adapt strategies accordingly Hudson. They suggest that the U.S. should resist the temptation to retreat from long‑term commitments simply because they are protracted, and instead assess whether the strategic aims are justified.

Context and Background

Both authors are well‑known neoconservatives and former architects of the 2003 Iraq War. Feith served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2001–2005), and Libby was Cheney’s chief of staff and national security adviser (2001–2005) Responsible Statecraft. They are affiliated with think tanks that have promoted military action against Iran, and their essay has been criticized by some as a call to “steel ourselves for more war” Responsible Statecraft.

In summary: The essay reframes the “endless wars” debate, rejecting the idea that duration alone should dictate policy, and instead emphasizes the importance of strategic purpose and long‑term resolve The Washington Post+1.

My CONCLUSION verified:  Bin Laden did believe the US lacked the political will to sustain a prolonged conflict if American casualties mounted.   He pointed to 3 historical examples:

1. Lebanon, 1983: Following the October 23 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. military personnel, President Reagan withdrew American forces from Lebanon in 1984.

2. Somalia, 1993: Following the Battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 American soldiers were killed, the United States subsequently withdrew its forces.

3. USS Cole, 2000: Following the bombing of the American destroyer in Yemen, which killed 17 sailors, bin Laden believed the lack of a substantial American military response reinforced his assessment.

What did bin Laden actually say?   In an October 21, 2001 interview, bin Laden described the American withdrawal from Somalia:  "The United States pull out, trailing disappointment, defeat, and failure behind it."

In a February 14, 2003 audio message, he again cited the American withdrawal from Beirut as evidence of what he considered American weakness.

These statements are documented in a compilation of terrorist statements published by the George W. Bush White House in September 2006.   The American Presidency Project+2

Why this matters:   Bin Laden's strategic calculation was that killing Americans would produce two effects:

  • Create enough American casualties and economic costs to undermine public support for military involvement.
  • Generate political pressure to withdraw American forces from Muslim-majority countries.

He wanted to provoke the United States into prolonged, costly conflicts that would eventually exhaust American public support.  A Brookings Institution analysis described this as bin Laden's strategy of provoking America into what al-Qaeda called bleeding wars.  Brookings+1

One important distinction: Bin Laden's prediction was about American political will, not necessarily the fighting ability or courage of individual American soldiers.   This distinction is particularly interesting when considering the relationship between public opinion, military strategy, casualties, and the psychological sustainability of war.

 


CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026–2036

 

The CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026–2036 projects a 2026 federal deficit of $1.9 trillion, rising to $3.1 trillion by 2036, with federal debt increasing from 101% to 120% of GDP over the decade.

Overview

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its baseline 10‑year outlook on February 11, 2026. It provides projections assuming current law remains unchanged. Congressional Budget Office

Key Budget Projections

Deficits

  • 2026 deficit: $1.9 trillion (5.8% of GDP).
  • 2036 deficit: $3.1 trillion (6.7% of GDP).
  • Rising net interest costs are the main driver of deficit growth. Congressional Budget Office

Debt

  • Debt held by the public rises from 101% of GDP in 2026 to 120% in 2036, surpassing the previous post‑WWII peak. Congressional Budget Office

Outlays

  • 2026 outlays: $7.4 trillion (23.3% of GDP).
  • Outlays rise to 24.4% of GDP by 2036, driven by Social Security, Medicare, and interest costs. Congressional Budget Office

Revenues

  • Revenues increase modestly from 2026 through 2036, reaching 17.8% of GDP by 2036. crfb.org

Economic Outlook

  • Real GDP growth: 2.2% in 2026, then averages 1.8% annually from 2027–2036. repec.org
  • Inflation: PCE inflation projected at 2.7% in 2026, returning to 2.0% by 2030. crfb.org
  • Interest rates: Short‑term rates remain above 3%; 10‑year Treasury yields rise from 4.1% in 2026 to 4.4% in 2031. crfb.org

Major Trust Funds

  • Highway Trust Fund: insolvent by 2028.
  • Social Security retirement trust fund: 2032.
  • Medicare Hospital Insurance trust fund: around 2040. crfb.org

Legislative and Policy Context

The projections incorporate laws in place as of January 14, 2026, including effects of the 2025 Reconciliation Act and trade policies as of late 2025. Congressional Budget Office

Summary

Overall, the CBO projects large and rising deficits, rapidly increasing interest costs, and debt reaching 120% of GDP by 2036, underscoring long‑term fiscal pressures under current law.

Associated Press reporting on Iran war

 Associated Press reporting on the Iran war

US loosens Iran's grip on Strait of Hormuz but the war is not over | AP News

The US has made progress in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, but the Iran war is far from over

By  JOSEPH KRAUSS  (Updated 2:55 AM EST, September 11, 2026)

In recent weeks, the United States has succeeded in loosening Iran’s grip over the Strait of Hormuz while virtually shutting down Iran’s own oil exports, accelerating its economic free fall.

But the war launched by the U.S. and Israel in February — intended to last a few weeks — is still far from over, and the stalemate is costly for both sides. An agreement reached in June quickly crumbled, with no sign of diplomatic progress since then. Low-level fighting persists, and the U.S. does not seem to have an exit strategy.

The mounting economic pressure on Iran has yet to stoke an uprising, and if its leaders are backed into a corner, they may opt for military escalation rather than capitulation. Their Houthi allies in Yemen have meanwhile stepped up attacks on Saudi Arabia, helping to push oil prices back up.

The price of a barrel of Brent crude, the international benchmark, surged above $100 this week, and diesel — heavily used in transport and farming — hit a record, potentially stoking inflation. U.S. President Donald Trump has acknowledged that gas prices are likely to stay high through the midterm congressional elections.

“Unfortunately, the U.S. is not winning in the war with Iran despite its limited success in loosening Iran’s grip over the strait and the devastating impact on Iran’s economy,” said Mona Yacoubian, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“Iran shows no sign of backing down, and instead has demonstrated a willingness to not only fight back, but escalate wherever it can. The war is likely to be protracted with no clear victor.”

Iran loses leverage as oil moves through the Strait of Hormuz

Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz — through which a fifth of the world’s traded oil and gas transits in peacetime — in the opening days of the war, using the worldwide economic shock as leverage. Meanwhile, it continued to export its own oil, mainly to China.

But in recent weeks, the balance has reversed. A U.S. blockade has virtually halted Iran’s exports, while the American military has facilitated greater exports by Gulf countries, according to figures compiled by Homayoun Falakshahi, an oil expert at Kpler, a global trade monitor.

He found that Iran’s oil exports had dropped from 1.85 million barrels a day last spring to around 255,000 in August. Exports of non-Iranian oil rose from 300,000 barrels a day at the height of the war to 8.4 million in September, and exports through alternative routes took that number to 10.8 million.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright boasted of similar figures on Sunday, saying “we’re probably two-thirds or more of preconflict flows.” Non-Iranian exports were at around 14 million barrels a day before the war, according to Falakshahi.

But the increased flow depends on a major U.S. deployment in the strait that has strained the military’s resources. The unpopular war has already cost U.S. taxpayers more than $37.5 billion and left 18 U.S. service members dead, and is expected to weigh on Republicans in November’s election.

Tehran could escalate in other ways

The tightened blockade and new U.S. sanctions are already taking a heavy toll on Iran’s economy, driving up prices and causing even longer lines outside gas stations.

But so far, it’s shown no sign of pushing the country’s increasingly hard-line leaders to make concessions on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s disputed nuclear program or its support for armed groups in the region.

“Washington’s main problem is that it still lacks a theory of victory: More ships are getting through, and Iran is hurting, yet none of that has produced a political outcome,” said Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the International Crisis Group think tank.

Iran has continued to attack ships in the strait, drawing limited U.S. strikes on its coastal areas and then responding with missile attacks on Arab countries hosting U.S. forces. Trump recently dismissed the conflict as “small potatoes.”

But with the U.S. supply of sophisticated interceptors showing strain, Iran could be tempted to escalate its attacks — or respond through regional proxies.

The Iran-backed Houthis launched a wave of attacks on Saudi oil facilities this week as part of a conflict that goes back more than a decade but has heated up in recent weeks. The Houthis are also attacking Saudi shipping, threatening its oil exports and a crucial trade route through the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint leading to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

The Houthis have damaged Saudi Arabia’s Jizan refinery, a large supplier of diesel and jet fuel to Europe, Falakshahi said. The volume of Saudi oil passing through the Bab el-Mandeb bound for Asia has plunged from around 3.4 million barrels a day in June to just 128,000 in August, according to Kpler’s figures, though it has recovered slightly to some 700,000 barrels per day in September.

“Tehran has repeatedly signaled that it will respond to growing U.S. pressure by moving up the escalation ladder, not by backing down,” Danny Citrinowicz, a senior researcher at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies and a former Israeli intelligence officer focused on Iran, wrote on X.

“Iran will not simply accept an indefinite maritime blockade, nor will it allow Washington to impose mounting economic costs without imposing costs of its own,” he wrote.

___

Krauss reported from the Middle East for more than 20 years, with postings in Cairo, Jerusalem and Baghdad.

The Cost of War? A nonpartisan research initiative RE: Costs of US post 9/11 wars,

 

The Costs of War Project is a nonpartisan research initiative at Brown University’s Watson Institute that documents the human, economic, social, political, and environmental costs of U.S. post‑9/11 wars, producing the most comprehensive public accounting of these impacts to date.

Overview

The Costs of War Project was established in 2010 by Brown University anthropologist Catherine Lutz and Boston University political scientist Neta Crawford. It is housed at Brown’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. The project brings together economists, anthropologists, lawyers, human rights experts, and political scientists to analyze the consequences of U.S. military operations since 9/11. Wikipedia

Mission and Scope

The project aims to promote public awareness and informed debate by publishing research on:

  • Human costs: casualties among civilians, U.S. service members, contractors, and allied forces. Brown University
  • Economic costs: U.S. war spending and broader economic consequences. Brown University
  • Social and political costs: domestic impacts of militarism and war policies. Brown University
  • Environmental costs: ecological damage linked to military operations. Brown University

Key Findings

Recent publications highlight:

  • Civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes in Yemen. Brown University
  • The intensified civilian harm from Israeli drone use in Gaza. Brown University
  • The U.S. energy cost of conflict with Iran, exceeding $40 billion for consumers. Brown University
  • Budgetary costs of U.S. operations in Venezuela, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific (over $4.7 billion from 2025–2026). Brown University
  • Estimated total deaths from post‑9/11 conflicts: 4.5–4.7 million direct and indirect fatalities. Wikipedia

Recognition

In 2022, the project received the U.S. Peace Prize for its research illuminating the human, environmental, economic, social, and political costs of U.S. wars. Wikipedia

Contributors

The project includes contributions from notable scholars such as Linda Bilmes, Andrew Bacevich, Cynthia Enloe, Hugh Gusterson, Jessica Stern, and others. Wikipedia

The Costs of War Project remains one of the most authoritative sources for understanding the full consequences of U.S. military actions since 9/11.