Doomsday Clock on Biosecurity

Below is an article written by some of the smartest minds in the Bulletin of the Atomic Science's Science and Security Board.   But intelligence rarely reflects wisdom.   And the best physics does not always reflect the fundamental principles of living and evolving things.

Biosecurity has certainly risen as a threat.  But pathogens have always been humanity's greatest killer and persistent threat.  Our advances in biotechnology have only accelerated the threat given our species' lack of attention to "the Laws of Nature and Nature's God".   

Pathogen evolution has only accelerated due to human laws violating both of these.

Immune systems have evolved to counter pathogens for well over 2 billion years of environmental change.  Human activities like pollution have introduced mutagenic chemicals and climate-changing pollutants that accelerate pathogen change and spread.  Our incursion into untouched environments exposes us to more our immune systems have never encountered.  

But it is our cognitive systems that now pose our greatest threat in following human alternative principles...like "peace through strength" instead of implementing the wisdom of 'global liberty and justice for all' that exacerbates every aspect of human security threats.  But particularly biosecurity. 

Given our accelerating human capacity to weaponize every technology (even social media platforms) that the threat of biosecurity is now (or should be) paramount in our minds with changing laws, governance systems, and focused financing.  

After reading their introduction here is what they recommended.  

"Every country must:

• ·      Make greater investments in public health; 
• ·      Develop, test, and optimize oversight regimes for risky research; 
• ·      Eliminate biological agents intended as weapons and dismantle programs producing them; 
• ·      Identify outbreaks before they become epidemics and pandemics; 
• ·      Share data, analytics, and intelligence on biological events; and 
•         Identify and attribute biological events quickly. 

These are great...except for "Eliminate biological agents intended as weapons and dismantle programs producing them;"

Knowing there are nations or groups already developing new bioweapons for tactical offense or even genocidal intention it's imperative that 'the good guys' develop every imaginable bioweapon first...so that extremely effective countermeasures can be produced prior to 'the bad guys' using what they will certainly develop.   This "gain of function' research is urgently needed given the current level of extremist views in nationalism, religion, environmentalism, racism, and anti-semitism.  

Prohibiting the weaponization of anything is a lost cause.  We can only prevent the human desire to use technology in horrific ways -- by winning the hearts and minds of those now driven to mass murder as a solution.   It's either the global 'rule of law' (laws democratically made and enforced, applied equally to all people, in the protection of their fundamental inalienable rights) or the law of force (anything goes!).   And time is running out.  
Investing in achieving the UN's 17 Sustainable Development Goals is our best bet at his time. 

*****************************************************************************

Doomsday Clock is Ticking on Biosecurity

Countries around the world must cooperate and deepen their investments in global health and biosecurity strategies.   By SUZET MCKINNEY, ASHA M. GEORGE and DAVID RELMAN   JANUARY 31, 2023 01:17 PM ET

Last Tuesday, we and the other members of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board moved the iconic Doomsday Clock to 90 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been. We moved it largely (though not exclusively) because of the mounting dangers, both direct and indirect, of the war in Ukraine. (See the accompanying statement we published alongside the time change.) 

The impact of this war on the global order has implications far beyond the nuclear realm and the battlefield more generally. The war thwarts international cooperation exactly when we need cooperation most—to address pressing 21st-century threats such as climate change, mis- and disinformation, and a problem we and others know quite well: the proliferation of biological threats.  

Devastating events like the COVID-19 pandemic can no longer be considered rare, once-a-century occurrences. The number and diversity of infectious disease outbreaks has risen since 1980, with more than half caused by zoonotic diseases (that is, disease originating in animals and transmitted to humans). Zoonoses put the human population in danger of pandemics, a danger we should expect to increase as a changing climate alters animal migrations and behaviors and humans continue to push their built environment into more remote spaces. There is immense, uncharacterized diversity within the 26 virus families and the many phyla of bacteria and other microbes known to infect humans. The world’s ability to predict which of these viruses and microbes are most likely to cause human disease is woefully inadequate.

In response to these growing biological concerns, we have seen many welcome advances in research. We live in a time of revolutionary advances in the life sciences and associated technologies. No doubt some of these could lead to better health outcomes for all. Researchers can engineer living things to acquire new traits with increasing ease and reliability, especially viruses that can be synthesized de novo in the laboratory. Such capabilities inevitably lead to dual-use concerns. But as life sciences and associated technologies advance faster and faster, they outrace oversight regimes, strategies for risk assessment and risk mitigation, and the establishment of norms for scientific pursuit. 

These are not idle concerns. Laboratory accidents occur frequently. Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity programs are challenged by human error, confusion about lab safety requirements, limited understanding of novel disease characteristics, poor appreciation for the risks associated with some research, and lack of local government knowledge about the types of research occurring in labs in their jurisdictions.

Leaders around the world must confront the possibility of global catastrophic biological risks. Sudden, extraordinary, widespread disasters may test or exceed the collective capability of national and international governments and the private sector to control. Cooperation in biosecurity is necessary now more than ever.

There are several important efforts to advance global regulation and cooperation in life sciences research. In September, the World Health Organization released a “Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research.” Similarly, in October, the White House released an updated “National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan,” which takes an all-of-government approach that could serve as a model for others. Both are worthy efforts.

However, much more is required. If we are to reduce these risks, all nations and national governments must make biosecurity a top priority. Every country must:

·      Make greater investments in public health; 

·      Develop, test, and optimize oversight regimes for risky research; 

·      Eliminate biological agents intended as weapons and dismantle programs producing them; 

·      Identify outbreaks before they become epidemics and pandemics; 

·      Share data, analytics, and intelligence on biological events; and 

·      Identify and attribute biological events quickly. 

If countries around the world cooperate on global health and biosecurity strategies and make investments in science, technology, research, and development in the biosecurity sector, we can minimize debilitating illness, widespread death, and disease-induced disasters.