Feith and Libby’s insane Essay on “Endless Wars” in Today's WashPost.

The next few blogpost (today - the first time I've done this) are in response to today's 'conservative' analysis in the Washington Post (print addition today) that has kept our nation (and the world) in an endless war against a tactic that can never be defeated. This endless war could collapse our nation by an unsustainable debt -- or the evolution of weaponry without the evolving of our national and global governing systems.  Flaws systems based on the delusion independence - that "We the people" have not used any of the three means of amending it - to move closer to our nation's founding document, the 1776 Declaration.   

 of WPost opinion piece.

Feith and Libby’s Washington Post Essay on “Endless Wars”

Douglas J. Feith and Lewis Libby’s November 10, 2026 Washington Post op‑ed argues that “endless wars” is a catchy slogan, not a valid reason to change U.S. policy, and urges leaders to focus on the worthiness of goals rather than the length of conflict The Washington Post+1.

Core Argument

Feith, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush, and Libby, a distinguished fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and former chief of staff and national security adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, contend that the phrase “endless wars” is appealing but misleading The Washington Post. They argue that the decisive factor in military decisions should be the worthiness of the objectives, not how long a war lasts Hudson.

Historical Examples

The authors illustrate their point with four historical cases:

• Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War: Faced unprecedented losses and political pressure to end the war, but understood that surrendering would have entangled the U.S. in disunion and slavery The Washington Post.

• Winston Churchill in 1940: Despite Britain’s isolation and uncertainty, vowed to fight for years if necessary, enabling eventual victory over Nazi Germany The Washington Post.

• Dwight D. Eisenhower in Korea: Secured a truce after a long, inconclusive war, which helped South Korea develop into a democracy The Washington Post.

• Ronald Reagan in the Cold War: Maintained a long‑term strategic stance to counter Soviet expansion, ultimately leading to its successful conclusion The Washington Post.

In each case, leaders avoided “endless” sacrifice only because they believed the goals were worth pursuing, not because they feared the duration of conflict Hudson.

Policy Implication

Feith and Libby warn that if adversaries see U.S. “fearful rhetoric” about endless war, they may adapt strategies accordingly Hudson. They suggest that the U.S. should resist the temptation to retreat from long‑term commitments simply because they are protracted, and instead assess whether the strategic aims are justified.

Context and Background

Both authors are well‑known neoconservatives and former architects of the 2003 Iraq War. Feith served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2001–2005), and Libby was Cheney’s chief of staff and national security adviser (2001–2005) Responsible Statecraft. They are affiliated with think tanks that have promoted military action against Iran, and their essay has been criticized by some as a call to “steel ourselves for more war” Responsible Statecraft.

In summary: The essay reframes the “endless wars” debate, rejecting the idea that duration alone should dictate policy, and instead emphasizes the importance of strategic purpose and long‑term resolve The Washington Post+1.

My CONCLUSION verified:  Bin Laden did believe the US lacked the political will to sustain a prolonged conflict if American casualties mounted.   He pointed to 3 historical examples:

1. Lebanon, 1983: Following the October 23 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. military personnel, President Reagan withdrew American forces from Lebanon in 1984.

2. Somalia, 1993: Following the Battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 American soldiers were killed, the United States subsequently withdrew its forces.

3. USS Cole, 2000: Following the bombing of the American destroyer in Yemen, which killed 17 sailors, bin Laden believed the lack of a substantial American military response reinforced his assessment.

What did bin Laden actually say?   In an October 21, 2001 interview, bin Laden described the American withdrawal from Somalia:  "The United States pull out, trailing disappointment, defeat, and failure behind it."

In a February 14, 2003 audio message, he again cited the American withdrawal from Beirut as evidence of what he considered American weakness.

These statements are documented in a compilation of terrorist statements published by the George W. Bush White House in September 2006.   The American Presidency Project+2

Why this matters:   Bin Laden's strategic calculation was that killing Americans would produce two effects:

• Create enough American casualties and economic costs to undermine public support for military involvement.
• Generate political pressure to withdraw American forces from Muslim-majority countries.

He wanted to provoke the United States into prolonged, costly conflicts that would eventually exhaust American public support.  A Brookings Institution analysis described this as bin Laden's strategy of provoking America into what al-Qaeda called bleeding wars.  Brookings+1

One important distinction: Bin Laden's prediction was about American political will, not necessarily the fighting ability or courage of individual American soldiers.   This distinction is particularly interesting when considering the relationship between public opinion, military strategy, casualties, and the psychological sustainability of war.